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ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA
115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Mountain Gravel & Construction Company (Con-
tractor) was hired by the Central Federal Highway Ad-
ministration of the United States Department of Trans-
portation to complete a highway construction project
in Colorado. The contract included a standard Subcon-
tracting Construction Clause (SCC) that encouraged
prime contractors to hire small disadvantaged business
enterprises (DBE's) by offering financial compensation
for the added expense of employing and assisting such
subcontractors. Petitioner, Adarand Constructors, Inc.,
submitted the low subcontractor bid on the guard-rail
portion of the project. The Contractor, however, took
advantage of the SCC and awarded the subcontract to
Gonzales Construction Company, a DBE under section
502 of the Small Business Act' (SBA).
The SBA sets out the definition of small disadvan-
taged business. A small disadvantaged business is at least
51% owned and controlled by persons who are both so-
cially and economically disadvantaged. A "socially dis-
advantaged" person is one who has been subjected to
"racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of
[his or her] identity as a member of a group without
regard to [his or her] individual qualities."3 An "economi-
cally disadvantaged" person is a socially disadvantaged
person who also demonstrates that his or her "ability to
compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired
' Section 502 provides: The President shall annually es-
tablish Government-wide goals for procurement contracts
awarded to small business concerns and small business con-
cerns owned and operated by socially and economically disad-
vantaged individuals. The Government-wide goal for partici-
pation by small business contracts shall be established at not
less than 20 percent of the total value of all prime contract
awards for each fiscal year. The Government-wide goal for
participation by small business concerns owned and controlled
by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals shall
be established at not less than 5 percent of all prime contract
and subcontract awards. Notwithstanding the Government-
wide goal, each agency shall have an annual goal that presents,
for that agency the maximum practicable opportunity for small
business concerns and small business concerns owned and con-
trolled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals
to participate in the performance of contracts let by such
agency. The Administration and the Administrator of the Of-
fice of Federal Procurement Policy shall, when exercising their
authority pursuant to paragraph (2), insure that the cumula-
tive annual prime contract goals for all agencies meet or ex-
ceed the annual Government-wide prime contract goal estab-
lished by the President pursuant to this paragraph. 15 U.S. C.
§ 644(g)(1)(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as
compared to others in the same business area who are
not socially disadvantaged."4
The statute creates a rebuttable presumption that
various racial and ethnic minorities are socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged. Prime contractors are autho-
rized to "presume that socially and economically disad-
vantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans,
and other minorities, or any other individual found to
be disadvantaged by the [Small Business] Administra-
tion pursuant to section 8(a) of the [SBA]." s
Adarand Constructors, Inc. brought an action un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI)
challenging the constitutionality of this presumption,
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
held that the program did not violate equal protection
guarantees. 6 Specifically, the trial court held that the
Supreme Court's decisions in Fulilove v. Klutznick7 and
Metro Broadcasting Inc v. FCC8 mandated less than strict
scrutiny in review of "benign" race-conscious measures
passed by Congress. The Tenth Circuit essentially af-
firmed. 9 The Tenth Circuit understood Fullilove as hold-
ing that "if Congress has expressly mandated a race-con-
scious program, a court must apply a lenient standard,
resembling intermediate scrutiny, in assessing the
program's constitutionality."0 The Tenth Circuit had
Z 15 U.S.C. § 637 (d)(3)(C) (Supp. V 1993). Such a busi-
ness is independently owned and operated, is not dominant in
its field of operation, and has annual gross receipts not in ex-
cess of the level set by regulation for the industry in which the
business operates. 15 U.S.C. § 632 (a)(1) - (3) (Supp.V 1993).
315 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
415 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
s 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C) (Supp.V 1993).The STURAA
also provides that, in the context of highway construction,
"women shall be presumed to be socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals." Pub. L. No. 100-17, 106(c)(2)(B),
101 Stat. 146 (1987).
6790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992).
7448 U.S. 448 (1980).
8497 U.S. 547 (1990).
9 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994). The district court had
mistakenly applied the Fullilove test to the constitutionality of
the federal highway funding provisions of the Surface Trans-
portation Assistance Act of 1982 and the Surface Transporta-
tion and Uniform Relocation Act of 1987. On appeal to the
Tenth Circuit, both parties agreed that the issue involved solely
the constitutional challenge to the SBA's rebuttable presump-
tion.
1016 F.3d at 1544.
previously applied this analysis in upholding the consti-
tutionality of the DBE program."
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court, in a fractured
plurality decision consisting of six different opinions (in-
cluding two concurrences and three dissents), deter-
mined that all dassifications based on race must satisfy
strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 2 To the extent that Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC13 suggests a less stringent scrutiny of federal
legislation, as opposed to state and local actions, it is
overruled. Essentially, the Court extended its holding in
City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.14 to benign race-con-
scious federal actions. The Court remanded the case for
determination of whether the legislation at issue was
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental
interest.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
The plurality opinion, written by Justice O'Connor,
was joined in toto by only Justice Kennedy and carried a
majority only to the extent that is was consistent with
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion. Justice Thomas and
the Chief Justice joined the opinion except for a discus-
sion of stare decisis not addressed in this note.
Justice O'Connor, in the primary opinion, deter-
mined that the Court's previous decisions regarding gov-
ernmental racial classifications established three general
propositions. First, any preference based on racial or eth-
nic criteria must be viewed skeptically, because "[a]ny
preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must neces-
sarily receive a most searching examination to make sure
that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees."'"
Second, consistency demands that "the standard of re-
view under the Equal Protection Clause is not depen-
" This analysis had been applied by the Utah Department
of Transportation as a prerequisite to the receipt of federal
funds. Ellis v. Skinner, 961 F.2d 912 (10th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Ellis v. Card,__ U.S..__ 113 S. Ct. 374 (1992).
12 The Fifth Amendment provides that "[njo person...
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law... " U.S. Const. amend V.
13497 U.S. 547 (1990) (5-4).
'4488 U.S. 469 (1989).
'5 Adarand, at 2111, (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of Burger, CJ.).
16City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494
(1984) (plurality opinion); id., at 530 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
'7Adarand, at 2111, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
93 (1976). Interestingly, none of the authority explains this
proposition. Both Adarand and Buckley cite to Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,638 n. 2 (1975). However, Weinberger
involved an issue of gender discrimination in the distribution
dent upon the race of those burdened or benefitted by a
particular classification."1 6 Finally, the Court stated that
congruence required equal protection analysis to be iden-
tical under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
17
Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence
continues to reflect fundamentally different understand-
ings of the role race and ethnicity play in American soci-
ety. The Adarand Court was confronted with a series of
previous plurality decisions susceptible to a variety of
interpretations. The Court attempted to reconcile con-
flicting rationales and judgments among Fuilove, Croson,
and Metro Broadcasting.
In Univ. of California v. Bakke", the Court first ad-
dressed the level of scrutiny applicable to race-based
governmental action designed to benefit, as opposed to
burdening, groups that have suffered discrimination.
Bakke, however, did not produce a majority opinion and
has therefore provided little guidance on the issue. In
Fulilove, the Court upheld Congress's inclusion of a ten
percent set-aside for minority-owned businesses in the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977. Again, there
was no opinion for the Court. Chief Justice Burger indi-
cated, however, that "[a]ny preference based on racial
or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most search-
ing examination to make sure it does not conflict with
constitutional guarantees."19 This opinion adopted a two-
part test, asking first "whether the objectives of th[e]
legislation are within the power of Congress," and sec-
ond, "whether the limited use of racial and ethnic crite-
ria... is a constitutionally permissible means for achiev-
ing the Congressional objectives."0
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court made explicit what
was implicit in Fulilove. Specifically, the Court stated
that because of Congress's broad powers in matters of
race, benign race-conscious federal legislation required
only intermediate scrutiny. These powers were seen as
derived from an "amalgam" of sources, 2' including
of social security insurance benefits, and did not discuss racial
discrimination. Moreover, of the five cases cited in the
Weinberger footnote, only one involved an allegation of racial
discrimination. That case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 in-
volved the application of Brown . Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) to the District of Columbia's public school
system. In holding that Brown was applicable to the District
through the due process dause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Court based its decision on the rationale that "it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution [that forbade public
school segregation in the states] would impose a lesser duty
on the Federal Government." Bolling, at 499. Nowhere is there
a statement that the Constitution does not impose either the
same or a greater duty.
18438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
19448 U.S. at 491."
201d., at 493.
23 Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564 n. 11 (quoting
Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 473 (opinion of Burger, CJ.)).
Congress's "institutional competence as the National
Legislature"," its constitutional powers under the Spend-
ing Clause,23 the Commerce Clause,2 4 and the enforce-
ment clauses of the Civil War Amendments. After Metro
Broadcasting, lower courts uniformly adopted the
Fulilove approach as clarified by Metro Broadcasting, and
applied intermediate scrutiny to benign race-conscious
federal legislation.
25
Between Fulilove and Metro Broadcasting, however,
the Court decided Croson.26 This case involved the City
of Richmond's determination that thirty percent of its
contracting work should go to minority-owned busi-
nesses. A plurality of the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment required strict scrutiny of all race-based
action by state and local governments. The City of Rich-
mond argued that Fullilove's rationale should be extended
to benign race-conscious action by state and local gov-
ernments. The plurality rejected this argument, stating:
What appellant ignores is that Congress, unlike any State
or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional
mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power to "enforce" may at times also
include the power to define situations which Congress
determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt
prophylactic rules to deal with those situations.27
By subjecting state and local affirmative action pro-
grams based on race to strict scrutiny, while requiring
that federal programs meet only intermediate scrutiny,
Croson created a conflict regarding the rights afforded
citizens under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the equal protection compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Adarand seemingly resolves this conflict.
The Adarand plurality determined that the Court's
decision in Metro Broadcasting, by squarely rejecting the
"congruence" proposition, had also "undermined the other
two - skepticism of all racial classifications, and consis-
tency of treatment irrespective of the race of the burdened
or benefitted group."28 The Court relied on the principle
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect per-
sons, not groups." Furthermore, the Court determined that
22Id.
23 U.S. const. Art. I, Section 8, Cl. 1.
24 US. const. Art. I, Section 8, Cl. 3.
25 See, e.g., Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc.
v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1992); Ellis v. Skinner, 961
F.2d 912,915 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 374 (1992);
Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 E2d 969, 975 (6th Cir.
1991); Milwaukee County PaversAss'n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419,
423-424 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991); see also
O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d
420, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1992); id. at 429 (Ginsburg, J. concur-
ring).
26488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
27 Croson, 488 U.S. at 490. Significantly, and perhaps fore-
shadowing Adarand, only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White joined this part of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson.
strict scrutiny was required precisely to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible racial classifications, adopt-
ing Croson's analysis on this point.
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justifica-
tion for such race-based measures, there is simply no
way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or
'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated
by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple ra-
cial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to
'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also en-
sures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so
that there is little or no possibility that the motive was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.3 0
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment, expanded upon this rationale and ar-
gued that applying anything less than strict scrutiny to
affirmative action programs "undermine[s) the moral
basis of the equal protection principle."3' Justice Tho-
mas views affirmative action programs as racial pater-
nalism and argues that such programs are just as viola-
tive of equal protection as discrimination inspired by
malicious prejudice because they "stamp minorities with
a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are 'en-
titled' to preferences."3'
In contrast, dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
argued that remedial, race-conscious legislation is dis-
tinct facially and in application from prejudicial discrimi-
nation. Thus, the two justices challenge the existence of
a "consistency" proposition, and insist that" [t]here is no
moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that
is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that
seeks to eradicate racial subordination." 3 To these jus-
tices, the proposition treats differences as though they
were similarities and disregards "the difference between
a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat."34
Additionally, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer
disagreed with the plurality's determination that strict
scrutiny is not"strict in theory, fatal in fact.""5 The Court's
'Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112. Justice O'Connor notice-
ably avoids mentioning Fullilove at all in this section of her
opinion and fails to address the distinction between federal
and state affirmative action legislation created in Croson.
29Id.
30Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493) (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, J.). This part of Croson was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Kennedy.
31 Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).32 Id.
3Adarand, at 2120 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
3Id. at 2121.
35 Adarand, at 2117 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)
(quoting Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 519) (opinion of Marshall, J.
concurring in judgment)).
decision in Adarand produces a majority opinion only if
Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment is added.36 Justice Scalia believes
that "government can never have a 'compelling interest'
in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make
up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direc-
tion."37 Presumably, therefore, the lower court on remand
can only uphold the rebuttable presumption if it finds
that Congress's purpose in enacting the SBA and the
Department of Transportation statutes was something
other than redress for past racial discrimination. This
approach requires the district court on remand to ad-
dress "facts about the current effects of past discrimina-
tion, the necessity for a preferential remedy, and the
suitability of this particular preferential scheme."3 Jus-
tice Scalia frankly admits that "[i]t is unlikely, if not im-
possible, that the challenged program would survive
under this understanding of strict scrutiny .....- 39
CONCLUSION
Adarand fuels the debate over the future of reme-
dial, race-conscious programs. Republican presidential
candidates have already made affirmative action an is-
sue in the 1996 campaign. On the other hand, the Cali-
fornia Board of Regents's decision to end affirmative
action in hiring and admissions was met by active stu-
dent protests.
Like the cases preceding Adarand, the opinion asks
more questions than it answers. The continued vitality
of legislation promulgated under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment is undecided. Fuilove and Adarand
are fundamentally in conflict, and must be reconciled in
future cases.
40
The emphasis placed on the individual nature of
equal protection guarantees suggests that class actions
36 Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas and
Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor's opinion, except for a dis-
cussion of stare decisis in section III-C of the opinion, which
only Justice Kennedy joined. Justices Ginsberg, Souter, Stevens
and Breyer dissented. Therefore, the opinion achieves a ma-
jority only to the extent that Justice Scalia joins Justice
O'Connor's opinion.
3'Adarand, at 2118 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
38Id. at 2132 (Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
39Adarand, at 2119 (opinion of Scalia, J. concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on ra-
cial discrimination may now be foreclosed.41 Justice
O'Connor's opinion specifically retreated from recogni-
tion of racial or ethnic characteristics as identifying a
cognizable "class". Additionally, Justice Scalia emphati-
cally argued that remedying past racial discrimination
in general cannot meet the test of a compelling govern-
mental interest needed to sustain benign, race-conscious
measures. This. suggests that future plaintiffs will need
to show racial or ethnic discrimination with much greater
specificity. Moreover, since the SBA's rebuttable pre-
sumption is unlikely to meet the requirements of Jus-
tice Scalia's concurrence, future cases may demonstrate
that a more particularized showing of discriminatory
intent or purpose is now required to make out a prima
facie case of racial or ethnic discrimination.
Finally, the dissent suggests that the standard of re-
view in deciding challenges to gender-conscious affirma-
tive action programs is now in question. Adarand cre-
ates a potential equal protection paradox - if all affir-
mative action programs based on race or ethnicity are
subject to strict scrutiny, are all affirmative action pro-
grams based on gender to be reviewed under a standard
of intermediate scrutiny? The dissent believes this to be
the case, and pointed out that under this scenario,
Adarand "will produce the anomalous result that the
Government can more easily enact affirmative-action
programs to remedy discrimination against women than
it can enact affirnative-action programs to remedy dis-
crimination against African Americans - even though
the primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was
to end discrimination against the former slaves."
42
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Paula Effle
40 "[W]e need not decide whether the program upheld in
Fullilove would survive strict scrutiny as our more recent cases
have defined it" Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (plurality opin-
ion).
41See Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (a) is to be interpreted
liberally to allow dass actions in civil rights cases); see also
Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460 (1978); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
42 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
